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A ShArp Turn TowArd The MArkeT: econoMic reforM  
in ruSSiA (1992–1998) And iTS conSequenceS  1
By analyzing and systematizing the literature accumulated over the past twenty years on the history of 
reforms, we can put in order the existing views on the processes that took place during these transformations 
and define a new vector in understanding the socio-economic development of Russia in the last decade of 
the 20th century and the first decades of the 21st century. The first step in this direction is the analysis of 
publications that reflect the preparation, progress and results of the contemporary economic reforms in 
the 1990s. The historiographic review includes the monographs written both by the advocates of the shock 
therapy, and their opponents and critics, first of all, Members of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The study 
of this literature allows to reveal the spectrum of opinions on whether the shock therapy was the preferred 
version of transformations, on assessing the results of reforms by the end of the 1990s and the opportunities 
for alternative ways to make the transition from a planned to a market economy. In particular, the advocates 
of the "shock therapy" refer to the threat of famine and civil war to justify decisions that led to decline in 
output, hyperinflation and other negative trends. Their critics point out that the lack of public support 
caused the market reforms to fail. By acknowledging the obvious, i. e. a significant deterioration of economic 
indicators, the advocates see their success in establishing the system of market institutions, and, on this 
basis, insist there was no alternative to implemented version of reforms. In turn, their opponents believe 
that the alternatives to the "shock therapy" existed, and their distinctive feature would have been the gradual 
cultivation and not the forced administrative introduction of market economy institutions.
Keywords: historiography, contemporary economic reform, shock therapy, price liberalization, privatization, economic 
recession
Introduction, or Why We Need a Problem Historiography
Strange as it may seem, the 20th anniversary marking the beginning of market reforms in the 
Russian economy (if we start counting from January 2, 1992, a day when the decree on liberalization of 
prices entered into force) went almost unnoticed at the official level. Most likely, the 25th anniversary 
in early 2017 will also be ignored. Meanwhile, the progress and results of contemporary economic 
reforms in Russia require not so much a journalistic debate on "What was that?", but a theoretical 
understanding, including at the level of historiographic analysis. After all, a fairly voluminous array of 
diverse literature — ranging from analytical articles in economic journals to topical monographs and 
even memoirs — has been accumulated over the past period.
The historiographic analysis represents an integral part of the conceptual understanding of the 
historical process in all its manifestations. The matters left unappreciated by contemporaries, usually, 
are acknowledged and expanded in the process of further development of historical science, and 
historiography allows to reveal more substantially the content of what was not noticed before. However, 
if we draw a parallel with a well-known quote of Yury Andropov about not knowing the society in which 
the Soviet people lived in the first half of the 1980s, it would be necessary to recognize that, even among 
the experts, there is no understanding of what was the direction of transformations in the economy of 
modern Russia, how to evaluate their results, whether the reforms are still going on and, if not, when 
they were completed. In this context, by analyzing and systematizing the literature accumulated over 
the past twenty years on the history of reforms, we can put in order the existing views on the processes 
that took place during these transformations and define a new vector in understanding the socio-
economic development of Russia in the last decade of the 20th century and the first decades of 21st 
century.
1 Original Russian Text © A. I. Tatarkin, V. L. Bersenyov, 2016, published in Ekonomika regiona [Economy of Region]. — 2016. — Vol. 12, 
Issue 2. — 325–341.
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Prerequisites of the Analysis
Accordingly, we need to group the most significant publications by various criteria, including the 
ideological orientation of the authors (advocates, critics), approach to presenting the information 
(analytical papers, memoirs, journalism), substance of analyzed subject matter (general course of 
reforms, privatization, agrarian reforms, etc.), regional aspects of reforms in the Russian economy, etc. 
In addition, the general chronology of events (1990s–2010th) should highlight specific periods, each 
with a special literature. Also, we have to consider such particular aspect of historiographic analysis, 
like the fact that the literature on reforms includes not only and not so much the works of historians 
as those of economists, sociologists and political scientists.
It should be noted that by now, some attempts to prepare the historiographic reviews on this 
subject have been made. Unfortunately, all too often, these attempts came down to compiling the lists 
of authors allegedly involved in studying the history of reforms in the Russian economy at the turn of 
the 21st century (this approach is particularly typical of the thesis in economics). One exception is the 
literature presented on the website on "Criticism of Russian Reforms" 2, although it includes mainly the 
responses to individual publications, including a review by A. D. Nekipelov 3 on collective monograph 
“The Path to the 21st Century (Strategic Challenges and Prospects of the Russian Economy)” [1], review 
by N. Ya. Petrakov 4 on the monograph of N. P. Fedorenko "Russia: Lessons of the Past and the Future" 
[2], and others. In addition, the website presents a number of historiographic reviews of the foreign 
literature on economic transformations in modern Russia [3–5]. Overall, we have to admit that the 
historiography of contemporary economic reforms in Russia needs further elaboration.
At the same time, one should recognize that it is virtually impossible to cover all the shades of 
such a vast subject as the historiography of contemporary economic reforms in Russia within a single 
journal publication. Therefore, this article attempts to systematize the most significant monographs 
and articles on the most active phase of transformations starting from the early 1990s and until the 
default of August 17, 1998. The lower boundary of the time frame selected for the study is rather relative, 
since the subject itself implies to consider the processes and phenomena of perestroika (1985–1991) 
and their assessment in the literature, but this story deserves a separate analysis. The upper boundary 
is determined by the default of August 17, 1998, a symbolic event, after which the reform process 
has acquired somewhat different features, even while maintaining the basic orientation towards the 
transition to a market economy.
If we proceed from the ideological (civic) position of the authors, who write about contemporary 
economic reforms in Russia, the advocates of the transformations implemented in the 1990s 
predominantly include those, who directly implemented them (Ye. T. Gaidar, A. B. Chubais, E. G. Yasin 
and others) and held at that time the key positions in the federal government. The criticism comes 
primarily from representatives of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Academicians L. I. Abalkin, 
N. P. Fedorenko, N. Ya. Petrakov and others), as well as various groups of researchers, who were not 
engaged by the liberal beau monde and tried to sum up the first results of market transition as early as 
the second half of the 1990s. [6, 7].
Defending the "Shock Therapy"
Undoubtedly, among the "apologetic" literature, a special place is held by the publications of 
Ye. T. Gaidar, the organizer of and ideological inspiration behind the transformations implemented 
in a way defined as the "shock therapy." In turn, in the general array of publications, we can highlight 
a number of monographs of various genres that present the rationale and justification both for the 
choice of conceptual framework of the reforms and the practical steps to achieve the established goals.
In this case, the analytical research is represented by personal monographs "A Long View: Russia 
in the World — Essays on Economic History" (2005) [8] and "Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern 
Russia" (2006) [9], as well as "Crossroads of Modern Russian History," a book written together with 
A. B. Chubais (2011) [10]. Two other monographs of Ye. T. Gaidar "State and Evolution" (1995) and 
"Troubles and Institutions" (2009) published under the same cover in 2010 [11] belong rather to 
journalism. However, the fine line between genres in these books is rather relative, because one could 
also find there the elements of memoirs. The actual memoirs of Ye. T. Gaidar were first published under 
2 Retrieved from: http://www.r-reforms.ru/index.htm (date of access: March 24, 2016).
3 Retrieved from: http://www.r-reforms.ru/indexpubnekipelov.htm (date of access: March 24, 2016).
4 Retrieved from:http://www.r-reforms.ru/indexpubpetrakov.htm (date of access: March 24, 2016).
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the title "Days of Defeat and Victory" [12] in 1996 and reading them allows to better assess the very 
personality of the leader of reformers, his motives and reasons of his judgments.
In particular, one gets the impression that the belief in personal righteousness can be largely 
explained by the inflated self-assessment of Ye. T. Gaidar. This is evident when we see in the text 
such slips of the tongue of as "Vitaly Koshkin asked me to come closer and said he wanted to become 
my academic supervisor" [12, p. 28]. At the same time, the characteristics given to rival politicians 
sometimes border on outright rudeness (such as the statements that G. A. Yavlinsky "secretly suffers 
from obvious flaws in his economic education" [12, p. 63], A. V. Rutskoy is an extremely narrow-minded 
individual with a "flip-flopping, insecure personality" [12, c. 160, 162], etc.) Maybe, this is where some 
xenophobic and even racist attitudes cultivated by Moscow and St. Petersburg "liberals" in the first 
decades of the 21st century originate.
The analytical papers on contemporary economic reforms in Russia, prepared with the direct 
participation of Ye. T. Gaidar, also include the three-volume book "The Economics of Russian Transition: 
Essays on the Economic Policy of Post-Communist Russia (1998–2008) [13–15]. It was published by the 
Institute for the Economy in Transition, the founder and director of which was Ye. T. Gaidar, and the 
first volume included the analysis of results brought by the reforms in 1991–1997.
The publications of Ye. T. Gaidar allow to get a more detailed view of the substance and progress of 
reforms, including the answers to questions addressed, as a matter of fact, to all those who write about 
the reforms:
1. Why the shock therapy version of transformations was selected and implemented?
2. How should be assessed the results of the reforms?
3. Was it possible to implement other versions of transformations in the Russian economy of the 
1990s?
G. Kh. Popov, a well-known economist and politician, who was the dean at the Faculty of Economics 
of Moscow State University when Ye. T. Gaidar was studying there, in an interview with "Sovershenno 
Sekretno," a weekly, offered an unexpected explanation as to why the leader of young reformers was 
sympathetic to the "shock therapy" (see http://www.sovsekretno.ru/articles/id/2437/). He said that 
Ye. T. Gaidar, who studied at the department of foreign economy, specialized in Chile. Accordingly, since 
he knew Spanish, he could familiarize himself in sufficient detail with the activities of "Chicago Boys" 
(Sergio de Castro, Jorge Cauas, Pablo Baraona and others) who implemented the first stage of radical 
economic reforms in that country (1974–1981) following the establishment of a military junta headed 
by Augusto Pinochet. G. Kh. Popov considers that this also explains the commitment of Ye. T. Gaidar to 
the doctrine of monetarism developed in 1950s–1960s by "Chicago School" led by M. Friedman.
It should be noted, however, that, in 1992, the reformist part of the Russian government did not 
follow the recommendations of Milton Friedman. As it is known, his idea that the pace of economic 
growth is determined by the money supply became the basis of the 2- and 5-percent rule for the 
annual increase of money supply. At the same time, in "A Final Schizophrenic Note" to his major book 
“Optimum Quantity of Money," M. Friedman admitted his inability to determine, which rule is actually 
more effective [16, p. 102–103]. Moreover, the doctrine of monetarism focuses on deflation as a clear 
sign pointing to the classic crisis of overproduction, which obviously did not correspond to the situation 
prevailing in the economy of RSFSR at the turn of 1980s–1990s. It is more likely that Ye. T. Gaidar drew 
upon the idea actively advocated by M. Friedman on the need to minimize the role played by the state 
in the economy ([17, 18] and other).
Ye. T. Gaidar tried to justify his rejection of the state as an economic entity in one of the first 
important works of the post-Soviet period written in August and September 1994 with an evocative 
title "State and Evolution." In this book, the evidence illustrating the inefficiency of state ownership 
was based on historical material or rather on repeating the well-known propositions that make up the 
concept of "Asiatic mode of production."
This concept had an uneasy fate in the Soviet historical and economic science. Despite the fact that 
its foundations were laid down by K. Marx, in the discussions that took place at the turn of 1920s–1930s 
around the notion of "Asiatic mode of production," the ideologists of the Central Committee of the All-
Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) accused those who acknowledged its existence in the countries 
of the Ancient East (L. Magyar and others) of establishing the grounds for "politically incorrect pro-
Trotsky sentiments" [19, p. 62].
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The 1960s saw a new discussion following the 7th International Congress of Anthropological and 
Ethnological Sciences (Moscow, 1964). This time, the proponents of the "Asiatic mode of production" 
did not suffer political repression, but the overall outcome of the discussion was predictable. After 
highlighting some logical inconsistencies in the opinions of those who supported the existence of the 
Asiatic mode of production, V. N. Nikiforov, an advocate of the official interpretation of the heritage 
of K. Marx and F. Engels on pre-capitalist socio-economic formations, concluded that "slave-owning" 
concept is at least more plausible than the hypothesis put forward to replace it." [20, p. 126].
A revived interest in the concept of the "Asiatic mode of production" in the years of perestroika 
(1985–1991) gave rise to yet another, third discussion. This time, it was openly acknowledged why 
the representatives of the "School of Magyar" and those who shared their ideas in the 1960s had been 
persecuted. The features of the Asiatic mode of production highlighted by K. Marx matched in general 
terms the realities of the socialist society in the USSR, including the predominance of state ownership 
in the economy and despotism in politics.
To illustrate the thesis that, under the socialism, the despotism is determined historically, 
contemporary Russian liberals like to refer to the book written by К. Wittfogel [21]. However, one 
should admit that they are attracted, primarily, by the anticommunist attitude of the author, a former 
Marxist, although in general the concept of K. Wittfogel has no fundamental differences with the 
concept of K. Marx and is highly vulnerable to criticism [see, for example, 22]. Most likely, this is the 
reason why the "hydraulic empire" of K. Wittfogel remained outside the attention span of the Russian 
social scientists in the 1990s–2000s.
In his book "State and Evolution", Ye. T. Gaidar also did not find the place for comments on largely 
artificial constructions of K. Wittfogel. When criticizing the fusion of power and ownership in the 
countries of the Ancient East, he simply prefers to state that: 
"The best incentives to innovate and improve the efficiency of production are the firm guarantees 
of private property. By relying on them, the Europe started, in the 15th century, to turn with increasing 
confidence towards the path of intensive economic growth outpacing the increase in the population" 
[11, p. 200].
In fact, the end of the 15th century was marked by an event that gave rise to just the opposite trend. 
After the discovery of America by Columbus, Spain quickly acquired the status of a great power and, for 
two centuries, acted as the gendarme of Europe exclusively due to the influx of gold and silver from the 
New World. During this time, the country experienced the degradation even in the area of agriculture, 
not to mention the crafts and trade. For their part, the German lands, except for a few areas, remained 
in deep stagnation up to the first half of 19th century. In this period, the examples of how the private 
ownership relations acted as a powerful incentive to develop the national economy were provided only 
by England and some Italian states. Even in France, the state personified by Jean-Baptiste Colbert, 
Superintendent (Minister) of Finance under Louis XIV, Emperor Napoleon I and other major political 
figures acted from time to time as innovation drive force.
In addition, it is necessary to consider the fact that the institution of private ownership had been 
cultivated since the age of antiquity. The large estates of European citizens had been accumulated 
over several generations, which allowed to perceive the existing wealth as not contrary to the law 
and morality. In his attempt to justify the accelerated pace of market transformations at the start of 
reforms, Ye. T. Gaidar asserts that, at that point, "the nomenclature had privatized almost all the entire 
economy" [11, p. 293]. As a result, the adopted measures appear to be very timely:
"If before the end of 1991 the exchange of power for ownership proceeded mainly in the "Asian" 
way desired by the nomenclature, this exchange took a turn toward another, market-oriented way with 
the start of real reforms (1992).
If considered from a socio-economic point of view, the liberalization of prices, decree on free trade, 
convertibility of the ruble, start of the orderly privatization meant the following:
“We managed to softly change the ownership system, a catastrophic system that existed at the end 
of 1991, without resorting to any violent measures and without introducing the emergency state in the 
economy” [11, p. 294].
Of course, the new owners were not recognized by other participants in the "voucher" privatization 
who had no opportunity to acquire anything significant due to their poor organization skills. At least, 
the desire of many new owners to sell the most liquid assets of acquired enterprises and maximize 
their personal income and consumption not only contrasted with the tradition of "Protestant ethics" 
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(as described by M. Weber), but also explained why the decline in the output of goods was comparable 
to the losses in a large-scale war. However, Ye. T. Gaidar believed that "to loose the pace would have 
been an unaffordable luxury." Since no clear explanation was provided as to why the lower pace of 
privatization would have been "unaffordable," we can only recognize with the author that "the decision 
in favor of launching (the reforms) as soon as possible was far from perfect, but it allowed to start moving 
forward the privatization mechanism, which in many ways predetermined the further development 
of economic reforms in Russia" [11, p. 298]. Anyway, the literature on such difficult subject as the 
privatization of state and municipal property in Russia requires a separate analysis.
The "State and Evolution" ends with somewhat unexpected acknowledgment by Ye. T. Gaidar that 
he considers himself and his like-minded as Russian statists and patriots: "I believe so for a simple 
reason — I see our main task in addressing the strategic problems of the state, completing the market-
oriented reforms and building of sustainable, dynamic, increasingly wealthy Western-style society in 
our country" [11, p. 328].
A more detailed justification of the substance and pace of transformations initiated in January 
1992 can be found in later books of Ye. T. Gaidar published in the 2000s. They make even more evident 
the reliance on extensive historical material, a particular feature in the author's approach to analyzing 
the economic trends and phenomena. A. Chubais even called Ye. T. Gaidar a "profound historian" [10, 
p. 11], a description accepted by no means all those who research the scientific heritage of the "father 
of market reforms." 
In particular, A. Berelovich found many insufficiently substantiated allegations and randomly 
selected data, as well as blatant disregard of the actual material that did not fit into the concept of 
the author, in the book "A Long View: Russia in the World — Essays on Economic History." Even when 
questioning the "Marxist" view of the "iron-clad laws of history," Ye. T. Gaidar continues to follow the 
rigid economic determinism and views the world history as a transition of leading countries from the 
"agrarian societies" to "modern (rapid) economic growth" with some remaining "anomalies," including 
Russia [23]. Accordingly, he sees the accelerated drive of Russia towards the liberal democracy and 
market economy as predetermined and having no alternative.
In this respect, "Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia" is even more revealing. The 
patronizing message embedded even in the title of the book should lead the reader to a simple logical 
chain: "Empires are short-lived — the Soviet Union was an empire, which ruined it — In order not to 
perish, Russia should abandon its imperial ambitions." The author begins with reflections on the 
nature of empires as a special form of statehood and immediately falls into the terminology trap. 
If the empire is any country which positions itself as such in its name, then the object of criticism 
vanishes. Not coincidentally, Ye. T. Gaidar did not even mention the infamous Central African Empire 
of the second half of the 1970s and its Emperor Bokassa, who used to eat (quite literally) his political 
opponents. He also ignored the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which formally existed in 
Western Europe in 962–1806 and was a sort of confederation of states with the nominal authority of 
the emperor chosen by the electors and kings (in this respect, the modern European Union is a much 
more centralized political and economic phenomenon). Finally, the author does not notice that, in a 
"soft imperial" form, the USA is currently controlling vast regions of the world, including Europe, a fact 
that is not even concealed by the American establishment.
But the supertask for Ye. T. Gaidar, as a historian, is to prove the existence of imperial features 
in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation in order to lead the reader to the key idea that the 
project named Russia is bound to inevitable collapse. This is the focus of extensive historical and 
economic essays in chapters 4–8 on the oil shocks of 1970s–1980s and their negative impact on the 
Soviet national economy, ideological and economic crisis of the perestroika era and the initial stage of 
contemporary economic reforms in Russia (1991–1992), which actually represents to us a particular 
interest.
Against this backdrop, the book "Crossroads of Modern Russian History" appears to be the least 
odious as it does not go beyond the traditional anticommunist discourse of liberal Sakharovites and 
pretends to neither refute nor prove the existence of "iron-clad laws of history."
In all these books, as well as in the memoirs of Ye. T. Gaidar, the answer to the question on reasons 
for selecting the shock therapy version of transformations is not reduced to the struggle against 
the "nomenklatura privatization," but refers to financial and food crises, two interrelated events 
that aggravated by the fall of 1991. To support this, the author presents a very extensive array of 
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documentary evidence, including from the archives, which suggests the following picture. The food 
shortages were evolving into a direct threat of famine and, to address this problem, the government 
did not have the necessary financial resources, including the foreign currency ("in the country, there 
was no grain and no currency to buy it" [10, p. 46]). The situation was explained by mistakes of the 
Soviet leadership headed by Mikhail Gorbachev, whose indecisiveness did not allow to proceed with 
the pricing reform at the right time (approximately in 1987–1988). Therefore, the only way out was to 
adopt the accelerated market transformations, including the price liberalization, privatization of state 
and municipal property, tight credit and fiscal policy, etc.
It should be noted that, in all these books, Ye. T. Gaidar contradicted his own statements to the 
media and recognized that, after all, there were grain and other agricultural products but the "peasants" 
did not want to sell them to "the city" at a fixed price. The same happened to other consumer goods. 
Therefore, the price liberalization was the first vital step at the first stage of reforms and it was adopted 
on January 2, 1992.
By the way, in this regard, we need to dispel one of the myths that accompanied the initial period 
of reforms. The general stream of criticism against the "government of reformers" included the 
assertion that nothing was explained to the people neither in the process of preparing the program of 
transformations, nor after the transition to its implementation. This is not quite true.
The materials of the second phase of the Fifth Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies (at the turn 
of October–November 1991) provided only the general outlines of the reforms, and this information 
simply could not arouse wide interest among the public. However, later, in November–December of 
the same year, the issues of price liberalization, privatization of state property, etc. were discussed 
in the media and scientific forums. In addition to official publications, collections of regulatory acts 
were published that constituted the legal basis of the first stage of reforms, in particular, these include 
the brochure "Economic Policy of the Russian Government: Documents. Comments" [24]. It had 
a special annex "Stabilization and Economic Recovery. Questions and Answers on Economic Policy 
of the Government of Russia," which described the concept and prospects of transformations. Later, 
there was also a publication of "The Program for Deepening the Economic Reforms in Russia" [25] with 
correspondent comments. Therefore, everyone could become familiar with the substance of planned 
transformations.
These publications already pointed out that the reformers in the government saw the main danger 
in the rising inflationary overhang and large imbalances in cash flows: "The shortage of goods coupled 
with the accelerating rise in prices, which reached 15 % per month or 650 % in annual terms — this 
was the essence of the crisis... The tax system was completely unfit to the inflationary situation. The 
share of state revenues in the gross national product fell by 2.5 times. All this contributed to complete 
collapse of the state budget, the guarantor of economic stability" [24, p. 58].
This was stated in the brochure "Economic Policy of the Russian Government." The brochure "The 
Program for Deepening the Economic Reforms in Russia" painted a similar picture: "By the end of the 
last year, the country found itself in a catastrophic situation. The ill-conceived steps in the economic 
management over the past few years resulted in the destruction of economic ties between producers, 
lack of incentives for productive work, loss of confidence in the national currency on the part of both 
enterprises and households. A typical picture of that period included the growing "barterization" of 
economic relations (extremely inefficient by definition), widespread use of the coupon distribution 
system for goods and products without any guarantee of their provision, absolutely empty shelves in 
the state-owned stores" [25, p. 3].
It was assumed that a tight credit and fiscal policy, as well as the maximum restriction in the 
effective household demand through price liberalization would ensure a sharp slowdown of inflation 
and allow to achieve a balanced budget. In the consumer market, with a strengthened ruble, the free 
prices should have become the main driver for the growth of output and improved quality of goods while 
eliminating the lines and shortages. The privatization of state-owned enterprises and conversion of the 
defense industry would have contributed, along with the reduced burden on the budget, to attracting new 
investments and restructuring the national economy with a focus on priority development of knowledge-
intensive industries and faster growth in the production of the most popular goods. The establishment 
of market mechanisms for regulating the processes in the national economy (system of stock exchanges, 
commercial banks, etc.) would have provided a guarantee that transformations were irreversible and 
would have completely removed the remaining elements of the directive planning system.
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First Results of the Reforms
The most expected results of the reforms included the following:
"The liberalization of the economy and foreign trade will be mostly completed during 1992. The 
inevitable feature of this period will be high inflation, which, however, should be arrested thereafter. 
Stabilization of the monetary system, lowering of monthly inflation to 3 % will strengthen the ruble 
and allow to introduce its convertibility for current operations. This will create the necessary incentives 
for production. The real ruble exchange rate will begin to rise, thus improving the opportunities for 
imports. At the same time, liberalization of external trade, reduction of export duties should ensure 
the growth of exports.
In 1992, the output was expected to decline by 15 %. This decline will be generally reversed in 
1993. As early as 1994, the output will begin to stabilize, which will be followed by some growth" [25, 
p. 59–60].
As you know, this forecast proved to be unrealizable. Even the well-known "liberal" economist A. 
Illarionov summed up the first results of the transformations by saying that only the February 1992 was 
the honeymoon of economic reforms followed by a "quiet counter-reform," and that the "irresponsible 
populist policy led to the sharp fall of the ruble exchange rate, depletion of inventories, explosive rise 
in prices, falling living standards for the overwhelming majority of people" [26, p. 25, 26].
The representatives of academic economic science made a definitive assessment for the initial 
period of reforms. In February 1994, “Voprosy Ekonomiki”, a journal, published the report of the 
Institute of Economics of RAS entitled "Socio-Economic Situation in Russia: Results, Problems, Ways 
for Stabilization." It stated bluntly that "the socio-economic situation in Russia following two years of 
the "shock therapy" is characterized by an unprecedented decline of the output, mass impoverishment 
of people, loss of social ideals and destruction of the moral fabric of society. All this raises grave concern 
for the fate of the country, and again brings us back to the question about the course of economic 
reforms" [27, p. 126].
Accordingly, the collective monographs published soon thereafter on the economic situation in 
Russia in the first half of the 1990s also acknowledged that the market reforms had led to results not 
expected in the reform program. Moreover, if the book "Economic Reforms in Russia: Results of the 
First Years (1991–1996)" assessed GDP decline as a percentage in relation to the previous year [6, p. 10], 
which does not allow to obtain comparable figures for the entire period of study, the monograph "State 
and Contradictions of Economic Reforms" indicated that, in 1996, the GDP of Russia was at 61.4 % of 
the 1991 level, including 51.3 % in the industry and 65.8 % in the agriculture [7, p. 54].
There were also other assessments of the economic recession, which can be explained by different 
methods of calculations and contradictory trends in the object of analysis (short-term rises in 
various years), and the choice of chronological boundaries for the study. In particular, Academician 
A. G. Aganbegyan claimed that, in 1998, the Gross Domestic Product of the Russian Federation fell 
to the level of 56 % of the similar figure in 1989 [28, p. 14–15]. Academician N. P. Fedorenko simply 
referred to a two-fold decline in the amount of Russia's GDP in the 1990s. [2, p. 282]. Other publications 
also confirm the fact that estimating the output decline in the range of 50 % compared to the pre-
reform period became a generally accepted journalistic trend.
In addition to statistical indicators, there were the assessments of trends reflecting the processes 
in the Russian society. For example, the Russian Academy of Sciences initiated implementation of 
the project "Economy and Social Environment: Unconscious Mutual Influence (academic supervisor 
Academician O. T. Bogomolov), which resulted in a number of major publications, including "Non-
Economic Facets of Economy: Unknown Mutual Influence" [29], a collection of articles by well-known 
social scientists and public figures.
The collection opens with a small section under the telling title "The Diagnosis of the Russian 
Economy." Academicians O. T. Bogomolov and R. I. Nigmatulin and Professor B. I. Nigmatulin used 
specific calculations to substantiate the idea, which, at the level of everyday consciousness, has long 
been perceived as an axiom: the contemporary economic reform was not a success, to put it mildly. This 
idea is shared by the authors of all subsequent sections on spiritual and moral foundations of social 
development, the socio-political structure of the country, its intellectual, scientific, technological 
and demographic capacity, as well as the Russian elite, an ephemeral and, therefore, even less known 
phenomenon.
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When assessing the results of reforms, Ye. T. Gaidar chose to focus on institutional changes rather 
than on indicators of socio-economic development of Russia. While acknowledging, in his memoirs, 
the growing economic and social problems during the transformations, he still claims that "first and 
foremost, what we managed to do was to put the reforms in motion, and launch the market mechanism." 
It is worth to mention his reaction to the enactment of the Decree on Free Trade at the end of January 
1992. The sight of a long line of people trying to sell "a few packs of cigarettes or a couple of cans of 
food, wool socks and mittens, a bottle of vodka or a baby sweater" near Detsky Mir store on Lubyanka 
Square in Moscow aroused in Ye. T. Gaidar a feeling of delight rather than sorrow: "If I had any doubts 
on whether the entrepreneurial spirit of Russian people survived seventy years of Communism, that 
day they disappeared" [12, p. 156, 221].
His books published in the 2000s include even more definite reference to institutional 
transformations as a symbol of success. In the "Long View," Ye. T. Gaidar reiterates that the main result 
of reforms is the fact that "... today, Russia is a country with a market economy. This fact is widely 
recognized in the world" [8, p. 413]. Accordingly, the "crisis of the industrial system and formation 
of socio-economic foundations for the post-industrial society" is viewed as the dominant issue for 
modern Russia. "This process defines the essence of today's transformation and the main challenges to 
be faced by the country in the coming decades" [8, p. 413].
"Collapse of an Empire" has no special section on the results of reforms implemented for 15 years by 
the time of the book's publication. Ye. T. Gaidar only links the success of institutional transformations 
with the failure to achieve his own political goals: "I and my colleagues, who started the reforms in 
Russia, understood that the transition to the market economy, adaptation of Russia to its new position 
in the world, to existence of the newly independent states will not proceed easily. But we believed that 
overcoming of the transformational recession, beginning of the economic growth, higher real incomes 
will allow to replace the unrealizable dreams of restoring the empire with prosaic concerns on people's 
own well-being. We were wrong" [9, p. 16]. In this case, as the context suggests, the dreams of "restoring 
the empire" were understood not even as the revival of the Soviet Union, but as the growing national 
consciousness of people in Russia, rejection of artificially imposed values, etc.
However, if the attempts to turn Russia into a "Western-style" state failed in the political sense, 
the institutional transformation in the economy, according to Ye. T. Gaidar and A. B. Chubais, proved 
their value in the emergency situation caused by the default of August 17, 1998. In the "Crossroads of 
Modern Russian History," the overcoming of the post-default crisis is explained as follows: "Experiment 
with the left at the helm of government in the fall of 1998 showed that they had been unable to turn 
the country back to the "bright Soviet past." The practice proved that, in Russia, the only way to come 
out of the crisis and ensure further development of the economy are macroeconomic stabilization and 
private ownership.
After coming to power in 1998, the left were unable to implement any of their slogans, whether to 
nationalize the industry, or abolish the circulation of US dollars or introduce state control over prices. 
This historic experiment showed that the earlier market reforms set a framework for adopting the 
general economic decisions. The left could not break out of this framework.
The mechanisms of the market economy had reached such maturity that their response to the 
crisis was quite adequate. The bankruptcies hit inefficient loss-making enterprises, while companies 
capable of growing and developing grew and developed. The long-term effects of the course taken 
following the default and subsequent actions of Primakov's government ensured that the economic 
growth, which began in Russia in 1997 and was interrupted by the crisis of 1997–1998, resumed as early 
as at the beginning of 1999 and proved to be sustainable over the next decade..." [10, p. 115–116].
In this context, the answer to the third question on whether Ye. T. Gaidar acknowledges that an 
alternative version of transformations was possible and acceptable is obvious. Nevertheless, we can 
note yet another episode that emphasizes the conviction of the leader of reformers in his righteousness. 
During the discussion in the "Troubles and Institutions" both with little-known American Professors P. 
Reddaway and D. Glinski [30] and with J. Stiglitz [31] (Nobel prize in Economics for 2001), he rejects the 
idea of slower pace of reforms, which should have begun with the establishment of market economy 
institutions while maintaining the social stability. Here too, the main argument is a reference to extreme 
situation (lack of grain, etc.), which in some cases is somewhat dramatically exaggerated ("When the 
state was simply unable to perform its functions") [11, p. 11–12].
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In fact, the state was able to perform its functions; otherwise, the reforms simply would not have 
taken place. However, the key question continued to be the pace of reforms, because Ye. T. Gaidar and 
his supporters considered the prospects of a "communist revanche" very real. Therefore, the leaders of 
reformers preferred to reject the proposals that implied the change of priorities in the implementation 
of reforms as 'a fortiori' unacceptable.
These fears of "revanche" and subsequent repression are understandable, given the details of the 
situation in the 1980s before the reforms, when future reformers were communist youth and party 
activists earning the reputation of anti-regime campaigners and simulating underground activity. 
Incidentally, A. Chubais unwittingly refuted the claim of Ye. T. Gaidar, that participation in youth 
seminars in Zmeinaya Gorka near Leningrad in the mid-1980s could lead to undesirable consequences 
for those who attended them, because they discussed "the most ideologically dangerous issues" [12, 
p. 43–44]. Indeed, since the late 1970s, a group of young academic economists from Leningrad held 
the meetings, where they considered a variety of topics, including NEP, Yugoslav model of socialist 
economy, economic situation in the USSR, etc. However, this happened within the framework of the 
Council of Young Scientists of the Leningrad Engineering and Economic Institute. Accordingly, the 
allegedly "clandestine" workshops in the suburban boarding house with the involvement of like-
minded Moscow intellectuals did not go beyond that framework [32, p. 5–8]. At the same time, it should 
be noted that these meetings allowed to build the team of the future reformist bloc in the Russian 
government, which then became the target of purposeful work by very different forces.
In particular, the Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor Ye. G. Yasin, in his lecture course "The 
Russian Economy. Origins and Panorama of Market Reforms," adds a curious story not found in other 
publications on the subject to the history of how the future reformers were prepared to their mission 
[33, p. 149–152]. He noted that an important role in elaborating the plan of upcoming reforms was 
played by a seminar in Sopron (Hungary) held by Vienna Institute of Systems Analysis in July 1990. At 
that time, under the project on Economic Reform and Integration, Ye. Gaidar, A. Chubais, A. Shokhin, 
P. Aven and other future reformers were trained under the supervision of W. Nordhaus, R. Dornbusch, 
R. Laird, and other well-known Western scientists and economists.
This seminar presented a number of subsequently implemented recommendations, including the 
start of transformations in the form of a "Big Bang" (shock therapy) with one-time liberalization of 
prices, extremely tight fiscal policy, immediate corporatization of major industries, etc. It should be 
noted that one of the guidelines was stated as follows: "No indexation, especially automatic one. The 
budget allocations should be planned only in nominal amounts followed by bargaining with recipients 
of budget funds who suffer from rising prices. Reject cynically their just demands to the utmost capacity. 
When this inevitable, provide only a partial compensation for losses" [33, p. 150–151].
Ye. G. Yasin summarizes the results of transformations in the 1990s by using the same institutional 
approach: "A minimum was made at the first stage, including the establishment of the market economy 
to replace the planned economy. Now, we need the next step and to make it the efficient economy..." In 
turn, he sees the incompleteness of reforms in the structural problems, that is, in the need to ensure the 
advanced structure of the economy with a predominant role of high-tech industries, etc. This requires 
"strong institutional prerequisites," including further liberalization, improved tax system, more active 
anti-monopoly policy, etc. [33, p. 429, 430]
In general, the lecture course written by Ye. G. Yasin is quite remarkable from the factual point of 
view. After a brief excursion into the history of Russia before 1917, it gives a fairly detailed analysis of 
the Soviet economy, discloses the details of preparing the reform program (Sopron workshop comes as 
no more than just an episode) and thoroughly describes all areas of transformations until the financial 
crisis of 1998. In a sense, Ye. G. Yasin presents a more substantive liberal interpretation of how the 
contemporary economic reforms were prepared and implemented in Russia than Ye. T. Gaidar and 
A. B. Chubais.
A fairly detailed, although more concise, description of the process of transformations is presented 
in Chapter II "Socio-Economic Crisis of the 1990s in Russia" of the monograph "Socio-Economic 
Development of Russia" written by Academician A. G. Aganbegyan [28, p. 14–47]. In this case, along 
with a sympathy of the author to the "young reformers," one can also find there a number of critical 
comments. In particular, the refusal to provide the indexation for household deposits and balances of 
enterprises on the bank accounts is described as an error, which resulted in the loss of trust in financial 
institutions, etc., and lead to increased popularity of the Russian Communist Party. He also accused 
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the reformist bloc of the government of not having a well-considered social and agricultural policy, 
ignoring the problems of military-industrial and fuel and energy complexes. However, the general 
conclusion is quite unambiguous: "And yet, with all these terrible mistakes, the strategic course of 
the government for the transition to a market economy, price liberalization, tight fiscal and monetary 
policies, privatization was justified..." [28, p. 32]
Academic View of Transformations in the 1990s
Unlike A. G. Aganbegyan, Academician L. I. Abalkin was, from the very beginning, a consistent 
critic of decisions and actions of the reformist bloc in the government. The collection of his journalistic 
publications in the early 1990s with an image-bearing title "At the Crossroads" includes an indicative 
article "Russian Economic Reform: First Results and the Need to Adjust the Course" [34, p. 70–77]. 
Initially, it was an analytical note sent to the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation 
R. I. Khasbulatov on February 4, 1992, that is, it recorded the impressions from the first month of the 
market reforms.
L. I. Abalkin saw the internal inconsistency of the reform program, on the one hand, in the hope on 
automatic processes of the market following the abandonment of the state regulation of the economy 
and, on the other hand, in the attempts to manage the economy by purely administrative commands 
(first of all, on the issues of privatization), as seen in the publication of numerous decrees and orders. 
At the same time, in his opinion, the program did not include any measures to stimulate the output 
and exports.
In a number of areas, the analysis of the first steps of reform was accompanied by forecasts which 
would soon become a reality. For example, he made the following prediction for the agriculture: 
"Here, we can expect not only the reduced output but also mass slaughtering of cattle and reduction 
of cultivated areas, which will result in protracted crisis." He also made the accurate projection with 
regard to financial stabilization measures: "If, in the near future, there is an upsurge of cash income 
(which is quite likely), then the hyperinflation on a gigantic scale will become inevitable" [34, p. 73].
The proposals of L. I. Abalkin on the adjustment of reform program implied the change of the 
course, i. e. a transition to stimulating the output, and all this not "in general," but for socially important 
priorities. Also, the main goal of privatization should have been the growth of output, rather than 
the replenishment of the budget. In addition, it was necessary to combine the transformations with 
measures aimed at social protection of people. Finally, he questioned the optimism displayed by the 
authors of the program: "It is impossible to improve the economic situation by the fall of this [1992] 
year. All programs designed for such a result are unrealistic and doomed to failure" [34, p. 71].
In the fall of 1995, during the debate at the Moscow Polytechnic Museum, L. I. Abalkin spoke already 
quite clearly when answering the questions from the audience: "The failure has been programmed by 
the errors in the selection of strategy... If we acknowledge the failure, we must name the reasons. 
These are not the confluence of incidental circumstances or some individual miscalculations, when 
the course is not changed for as long as four years, and the collapse is only worsening. None of the 
goals has been achieved (whether in the fight against inflation or stabilization of output). None of the 
forecasts has proved right. When Gaidar declared that, in 1992, after the liberalization of prices, they 
would increase by 1.5–2 times, while they grew by 26 times, then, sorry, it's not a miscalculation, this 
is a fundamentally wrong assessment of the situation. Gaidar said later that, if the government had 
immediately announced that the prices would increase by 26 times, it would be dismissed and not 
allowed to carry out reforms. But then Gaidar must choose one of the two things: either he miscalculated 
as a professional economist, or he misled people in politics" [35, p. 147–148].
This statement can be found in the collection of speeches by L. I. Abalkin "The Logic of Economic 
Growth" published in 2002. His monograph "Russia: A Search for Self-Determination" [36] appeared in 
the same year. One of its essays conveyed a simple idea: "All global experience of profound, qualitative 
transformations reveals a general pattern: their success and — just as importantly — their irreversibility 
took place only when they serve the interests of the majority of people " [36, p. 55]. This is the basis that 
we should use when assessing the opinion of L. I. Abalkin on the version of implementation, results 
and possible alternatives to market transformations of the 1990s in Russia.
Like L. I. Abalkin, Academician N. P. Fedorenko assessed the contemporary economic reforms in the 
context of Russia's historical path. In his monograph "Russia: Lessons of the Past and Faces the Future" 
[2], he embeds the narrative of reforms in the analysis of secular trends that reflect the dynamics in 
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the national wealth, natural resources, scientific and technical, material and production capacity, as 
well as the population of Russia over the period from the end of the 19th century until the end of the 
20th century. The transformations of the 1990s are the subject of two sections in Chapter 4 "Attempts 
to Reform the Russian Economy and Development of Russian Economic Thought" and one section in 
Chapter 8 "Economic Mechanism of Modern Market Economy."
N. P. Fedorenko explained the selection of the shock therapy option for reforming of the Russian 
economy as follows: "Starting from "500 days" program, all plans (and actually the actions) of today's 
reformers had one major flaw: they were overloaded teleologically, i. e., they were more focused on the 
market economy as a goal than adapted to modification of the economic system. Two points were the 
most important for reformers of the early 1990s — wipe everything from the board without leaving a 
trace, and wipe it as quickly as possible" [2, p. 256–257].
Assessing the results of shock therapy as a failure, he pointed out to three errors of "reformers" 
(or "radicals" in the terminology of N. P. Fedorenko): "First of all, based on the fact that the generally 
accepted theory describes the economy as a complex of a system of equations, our theoreticians 
came to conclusion that the reforms should be comprehensive and systemic, and not implemented by 
parts... Secondly, there was no sufficient consideration for the general theoretical provision that the 
functioning of a market economy requires a developed system of legal, social, financial, and regulatory 
institutions… Thirdly, the expectation of instant change in the economic behavior of economic entities, 
as the conditions for utility or profit maximization were restructured in a market-oriented manner, 
proved to be unjustified... " [2, p. 259]
N. P. Fedorenko considered possible alternative versions of transformations within the framework 
of a dichotomy: either the formation of pseudomarket relations, or the formation of the socially 
oriented market economy. Accordingly, he quite optimistically viewed the prospects promised by the 
new century: "As a result, Russia saw the formation of a quasi-market type mixed economy, which 
created the prerequisites for deploying the process of building a civilized and efficient market economy 
that preserves the principles of free competition while taking care of poor and disadvantaged... But all 
this will apparently happen in future" [2, p. 387, 391].
This monograph of N. P. Fedorenko appeared in a series of "Russian Academicians about the 
Economy." The series was opened in 1998 with the publication of the book written by Academician 
N. Ya. Petrakov "Russian Roulette: An Economic Experiment at the Cost of 150 Million Lives" [37]. Its 
narrative of reforms was embedded in the scheme of "theory plus practice" rather than into a general 
historical context. Therefore, the first sections of the monograph describe the cybernetic market 
theory and the theory of sustainable development while the transformation processes of the 1990s are 
examined from the standpoint of not only the analyst, but also a direct participant in the events.
The assessment made by N. Ya. Petrakov about the progress and results of transformations is 
unambiguous ("The achievement of Russian reformers is a market without money") and is largely 
consonant with the opinion of other full members of RAS, who criticized the actions of the Russian 
government all along the "hard 1990s." However, his position can be assessed in more detail by reading 
a collection of his journalistic articles "Economic "Santa Barbara": A Diary of Market Economist" [38].
For a number of years, N. Ya. Petrakov published a column in "Obshchaya Gazeta," a newspaper, 
where he commented on the economic situation both as a scientist and a citizen; as a result, his opinions 
on the reform and reformers collected under one cover are unusually polemical for the academic style.
N. Ya. Petrakov questioned the shock therapy version of transformations immediately after the 
keynote speech by Russian President Boris Yeltsin at the Fifth Congress of People's Deputies of RSFSR 
in early November 1991: "There is an opinion that economic reform shall be implemented by dashing 
ahead. But a reform is not made with an ax... No market economy can exist without the liberalization of 
prices. But it can neither exist without competition. It is very difficult to achieve both simultaneously. 
You can, indeed, free the prices immediately, but creating conditions for competition is a process" [38, 
p. 5].
The first steps of reformers were evaluated not only from scientific but also from a moral 
standpoint: "In my opinion, it is already obvious now that the initiated reforms were not prepared 
either methodologically or organizationally... Behind this kind of improvisation, alas, one can see the 
organizational failure and disregard for "human material" used in the experiment" [38, p. 7, 8]. It should 
be noted that unregulated street trading, that delighted Ye. T. Gaidar, was very differently assessed by 
N. Ya. Petrakov: "Flea market is the agony of the market economy and not its harbinger" [38, p. 16].
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All this was said and written during the initial stage of the transformations. Five years later, when 
summing up the achieved results, N. Ya. Petrakov noted the following: "The first months of 1992 put an 
end to empty store shelves in Russia. The euphoria about this still excites young reformers when they 
write their memoirs... But there is one tiny annoyance — the domestic output collapsed by more than 
half, while for the consumer products it shrunk by two-thirds" [38, p. 62].
The belief, that there is no alternative to adopted decisions, professed by reformers, is seen by 
N. Ya. Petrakov as a typical feature of radical politics. Therefore, he says, no one wants to acknowledge 
that the case of transforming the totalitarian economy into the market economy completely and almost 
hopelessly failed, and "the boys are now writing their memoirs that look like letters of explanation" [38, 
p. 53, 54].
The assessment of the contemporary economic reforms in Russia by Academician S. Yu. Glazyev 
is made in no less vigorous terms. His view on the course and results of the transformations is even 
more remarkable, since initially he was part of the "Gaidar team" and first served as a Deputy Minister 
and later as the Minister of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation. After parting with 
the "young reformers" based on ideological differences in the days of political crisis at the turn of 
September and October of 1993, S. Yu. Glazyev could not avoid a special characterization on the part 
of Ye. T. Gaidar, who assumed that his former ally sided with the Russian Supreme Soviet for career 
reasons, as he later became one of the leaders of the "communist-nationalist bloc in the Duma" [12, p. 
281].
For his part, S. Yu. Glazyev in his publications prefers to assess the economic events and trends, 
rather than personalities. In 2003, in collaboration with S. G. Kara-Murza and S. A. Batchikov, he 
published the "White Paper of Reforms" [39], which includes extensive statistical data on demography 
and wellbeing of the population in Russia, as well as the situation in the manufacturing, construction, 
agriculture and transport over the first decade of transformations. However, in terms of substance, 
the reforms were assessed in his later monograph "Lessons of Yet Another Russian Revolution: The 
Collapse of the Liberal Utopia and the Chance for "Economic Miracle" [40].
Although in this book S. Yu. Glazyev focuses mostly on analyzing the situation in the 2000s and the 
prospects of the Russian economy after the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, the book starts with 
section 1 that has a characteristic title "Catastrophe instead of Reforms"
When assessing the start of transformations in the form of shock therapy, S. Yu. Glazyev admits 
that, at the turn 1991–1992, the Russian economy was facing a difficult situation, but he immediately 
points out that the main error of reformers was not even the haste and ill-conceived character of 
decisions, but the general orientation toward the doctrine of market fundamentalism, or rather the 
dogma of the "Washington Consensus," i. e. a standard set of recommendations for anti-crisis economic 
policy in the underdeveloped countries of the Third World. Accordingly, based on the analysis of time 
series for a large number of indicators S. Yu. Glazyev shows that "two decades after the start of radical 
reforms, by virtually all indicators of the output efficiency, the Russian economy looks much worse 
than the Soviet model of 1990" [40, p. 68].
As for the first decade of transformations, S. Yu. Glazyev sees the changes in this period in the form 
of five shock waves of growing chaos, economic destruction and impoverishment of the population:
Shock 1. Liberalization of prices, depreciation of incomes and savings of people.
Shock 2. Loss of rights to previously created public property by the overwhelming majority of 
people, state corruption and criminalization of the economy.
Shock 3. Depreciation of savings and repeated loss of property by the people in pyramid schemes.
Shock 4. Destruction of public productive forces as a result of implemented macroeconomic policy.
Shock 5. Involvement of the state budget, people's savings and financial resources of the production 
sector in the government debt pyramid [40, p. 115, 119, 122, 124, 128].
S. Yu. Glazyev sees the alternative to market fundamentalism in the Chinese version of gradual 
transition "from plan to market" under the state control: "While the Russian economy was shrinking in 
convulsions of shock therapy, the Chinese leadership, based on the principles unsuccessfully proposed 
by academic science to Russian leaders, implemented a successful modernization of the economy on 
the basis of the gradual cultivation of market institutions" [40, p. 69].
The reference to the authority of academic economic science is not incidental. The representatives 
from economic institutes of RAS did not just criticize for many years the reformist course of the Russian 
government, but offered from the very beginning their version of transformations without hasty and 
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ill-conceived decisions. When asserting that "reformers invented the myth of inevitable economic 
catastrophe" S. Yu. Glazyev provides the following counterargument. According to the calculations of 
the Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences, without any change (i.e. 
reforms), in 1991–1993, the Russian economy would have experienced a downturn with the output 
decline of no more than 2 %. In the case of science-based and planned transition to the market, the 
economy could have achieved the growth at the pace of no less than 3 % per year [40, p. 60].
Instead of Conclusion
Even a brief historiographic review of the literature on contemporary economic reforms in Russia 
offers a contradictory set of answers to the questions posed at the center of analysis. The advocates of 
the "shock therapy" refer to the threat of famine and civil war to justify decisions adopted in 1991–1992 
that led to decline in output, hyperinflation and other negative trends. Their critics on this issue rather 
stress the inhumanity of chosen path and point out that the lack of public support caused the failure 
of market transformations. By acknowledging the obvious, i. e. a significant deterioration of economic 
indicators, the advocates see their success in establishing the system of market institutions, and, on 
this basis, insist there was no alternative to implemented version of reforms. In turn, their opponents 
believe that there were the alternatives to shock therapy, and their distinctive feature would have been 
the desire to gradually cultivate, rather than introduce in the administrative way, the market economy 
institutions in Russia, while preserving the social achievements of the Soviet era.
Of course, a large amount of literature on the subject has been left out of this review. However, 
we see the continuation of historiographic analysis not in repeating the conclusions by providing the 
examples of other publications, but in the detailed description of views on a number of most remarkable 
issues, in particular, the privatization of state and municipal property, default of August 17, 1998, and 
the change of government policy in the 2000s, agricultural component of contemporary economic 
reforms in Russia, etc. In this case, the overall picture of transformations will be complemented by new 
analysis and conclusions.
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